

sufficiently strong for it to retain some normative quality; in this sense **civilization, a civilized way of life, the conditions of civilized society** may be seen as capable of being lost as well as gained.

See CITY, CULTURE, DEVELOPMENT, MODERN, SOCIETY, WESTERN

CLASS

Class is an obviously difficult word, both in its range of meanings and in its complexity in that particular meaning where it describes a social division. The Latin word *classis*, a division according to property of the people of Rome, came into English in 1C16 in its Latin form, with a plural *classes* or *classics*. There is a 1C16 use (King, 1594) which sounds almost modern: ‘all the classics and ranks of vanitie’. But **classis** was primarily used in explicit reference to Roman history, and was then extended, first as a term in church organization (‘assemblies are either classes or synods’, 1593) and later as a general term for a division or group (‘the classis of Plants’, 1664). It is worth noting that the derived Latin word *classicus*, coming into English in eC17 as **classic** from fw *classique*, F, had social implications before it took on its general meaning of a standard authority and then its particular meaning of belonging to Greek and Roman antiquity (now usually distinguished in the form **classical**, which at first alternated with *classic*). Gellius wrote: ‘*classicus ... scriptor, non proletarius*’. But the form **class**, coming into English in C17, acquired a special association with education. Blount, glossing *classe* in 1656, included the still primarily Roman sense of ‘an order or distribution of people according to their several Degrees’ but added: ‘in Schools (wherein this word is most used) a Form or Lecture restrained to a certain company of Scholars’ - a use which has remained common in education. The development of **classic** and **classical** was strongly affected by this association with authoritative works for study.

From 1C17 the use of **class** as a general word for a group or division became more and more common. What is then most difficult

is that **class** came to be used in this way about people as well as about plants and animals, but without social implications of the modern kind. (Cf. Steele, 1709: ‘this Class of modern Wits’.) Development of **class** in its modern social sense, with relatively fixed names for particular classes (**lower class, middle class, upper class, working class** and so on), belongs essentially to the period between 1770 and 1840, which is also the period of the Industrial Revolution and its decisive reorganization of society. At the extremes it is not difficult to distinguish between (i) **class** as a general term for any grouping and (ii) **class** as a would-be specific description of a social formation. There is no difficulty in distinguishing between Steele’s ‘Class of modern Wits’ and, say, the *Declaration* of the Birmingham Political Union (1830) ‘that the rights and interests of the middle and lower classes of the people are not efficiently represented in the Commons House of Parliament’. But in the crucial period of transition, and indeed for some time before it, there is real difficulty in being sure whether a particular use is sense (i) or sense (ii). The earliest use that I know, which might be read in a modern sense, is Defoe’s ‘ ‘tis plain the dearness of wages forms our people into more classes than other nations can show’ (*Review*, 14 April 1705). But this, even in an economic context, is far from certain. There must also be some doubt about Hanway’s title of 1772: ‘Observations on the Causes of the Dissoluteness which reigns among the lower classes of the people’. We can read this, as indeed we would read Defoe, in a strictly social sense, but there is enough overlap between sense (i) and sense (ii) to make us pause. The crucial context of this development is the alternative vocabulary for social divisions, and it is a fact that until 1C18, and residually well into C19 and even C20, the most common words were *rank* and *order*, while *estate* and *degree* were still more common than **class**. *Estate*, *degree* and *order* had been widely used to describe social position from medieval times. *Rank* had been common from 1C16. In virtually all contexts where we would now say **class** these other words were standard, and *lower order* and *lower orders* became especially common in C18.

The essential history of the introduction of **class**, as a word which would supersede older names for social divisions, relates to the increasing consciousness that social position is made rather than merely inherited. All the older words, with their essential metaphors of standing, stepping and arranging in rows, belong to a society in

which position was determined by birth. Individual mobility could be seen as movement from one *estate, degree, order* or *rank* to another. What was changing consciousness was not only increased individual mobility, which could be largely contained within the older terms, but the new sense of a SOCIETY (q.v.) or a particular *social system* which actually created social divisions, including new kinds of divisions. This is quite explicit in one of the first clear uses, that of Madison in *The Federalist* (USA, c. 1787): moneyed and manufacturing interests ‘grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views’. Under the pressure of this awareness, greatly sharpened by the economic changes of the Industrial Revolution and the political conflicts of the American and French revolutions, the new vocabulary of class began to take over. But it was a slow and uneven process, not only because of the residual familiarity of the older words, and not only because conservative thinkers continued, as a matter of principle, to avoid **class** wherever they could and to prefer the older (and later some newer) terms. It was slow and uneven, and has remained difficult, mainly because of the inevitable overlap with the use of class not as a specific social division but as a generally available and often *ad hoc* term of grouping.

With this said, we can trace the formation of the newly specific **class** vocabulary. **Lower** classes was used in 1772, and lowest classes and lowest class were common from the 1790s. These carry some of the marks of the transition, but do not complete it. More interesting because less dependent on an old general sense, in which the **lower** classes would be not very different from the COMMON (q.v.) *people*, is the new and increasingly self-conscious and self-used description of the **middle classes**. This has precedents in ‘men of a middle condition’ (1716), ‘the middle Station of life’ (Defoe, 1719), ‘the Middling People of England . . . generally Good-natured and Stout-hearted’ (1718), ‘the middling and lower classes’ (1789). Gisborne in 1795 wrote an ‘Enquiry into the Duties of Men in the Higher Rank and Middle Classes of Society in Great Britain’. Hannah More in 1796 wrote of the ‘middling classes’. The ‘burden of taxation’ rested heavily ‘on the middle classes’ in 1809 (*Monthly Repository*, 501), and in 1812 there was reference to ‘such of the Middle Class of Society who have fallen upon evil days’ (*Examiner*, August). *Rank* was still used at least as often, as in James Mill

(1820): ‘the class which is universally described as both the most wise and the most virtuous part of the community, the middle rank’ (*Essay on Government*), but here **class** has already taken on a general social sense, used on its own. The swell of self-congratulatory description reached a temporary climax in Brougham’s speech of 1831: ‘by the people, I mean the middle classes, the wealth and intelligence of the country, the glory of the British name’.

There is a continuing curiosity in this development. *Middle* belongs to a disposition between *lower* and *higher*, in fact as an insertion between an increasingly insupportable *high* and *low*. **Higher classes** was used by Burke (*Thoughts on French Affairs*) in 1791, and **upper classes** is recorded from the 1820s. In this model an old hierarchical division is still obvious; the **middle class** is a self-conscious interposition between persons of *rank* and the *common people*. This was always, by definition, indeterminate: this is one of the reasons why the grouping word **class** rather than the specific word *rank* eventually came through. But clearly in Brougham, and very often since, the *upper or higher* part of the model virtually disappears, or, rather, awareness of a *higher* class is assigned to a different dimension, that of a residual and respected but essentially displaced aristocracy.

This is the ground for the next complication. In the fierce argument about political, social and economic rights, between the 1790s and the 1830s, **class** was used in another model, with a simple distinction of the **productive** or **useful classes** (a potent term against the aristocracy). In the widely-read translation of Volney’s *The Ruins, or A Survey of the Revolutions of Empires* (2 parts, 1795) there was a dialogue between those who by ‘useful labours contribute to the support and maintenance of society’ (the majority of the people, ‘labourers, artisans, tradesmen and every profession useful to society’, hence called *People*) and a **Privileged class** (‘priests, courtiers, public accountants, commanders of troops, in short, the civil, military or religious agents of government’). This is a description in French terms of *the people* against an aristocratic government, but it was widely adopted in English terms, with one particular result which corresponds to the actual political situation of the reform movement between the 1790s and the 1830s: both the self-conscious **middle classes** and the quite different people who by the end of this period would describe themselves as the **working**

classes adopted the descriptions **useful or productive classes**, in distinction from and in opposition to the *privileged* or the *idle*. This use, which of course sorts oddly with the other model of *lower*, *middle* and *higher*, has remained both important and confusing.

For it was by transfer from the sense of *useful* or *productive* that the **working classes** were first named. There is considerable overlap in this: cf. ‘middle and industrious classes’ (*Monthly Magazine*, 1797) and ‘poor and working classes’ (Owen, 1813) - the latter probably the first English use of **working classes** but still very general. In 1818 Owen published *Two Memorials on Behalf of the Working Classes*, and in the same year *The Gorgon* (28 November) used **working classes** in the specific and unmistakable context of relations between ‘workmen’ and ‘their employers’. The use then developed rapidly, and by 1831 the *National Union of the Working Classes* identified not so much privilege as the ‘laws . . . made to protect . . . property or capital’ as their enemy. (The, distinguished such laws from those that had not been made to protect INDUSTRY (q.v.), still in its old sense of applied labour.) In the *Poor Man’s Guardian* (19 October 1833), O’Brien wrote of establishing for ‘the productive classes a complete dominion over the fruits of their own industry’ and went on to describe such a change as ‘contemplated by the working classes’; the two terms, in this context, are interchangeable. There are complications in phrases like the **labouring classes** and the **operative classes**, which seem designed to separate one group of the **useful classes** from another, to correspond with the distinction between *workmen* and *employers*, or *men* and *masters*: a distinction that was economically inevitable and that was politically active from the 1830s at latest. The term **working classes**, originally assigned by others, was eventually taken over and used as proudly as **middle classes** had been: ‘the working classes have created all wealth’ (*Rules of Ripponden Co-operative Society*; cit. J. H. Priestley, *History of RCS*; dating from 1833 or 1839).

By the 1840s, then, **middle classes** and **working classes** were common terms. The former became singular first; the latter is singular from the 1840s but still today alternates between singular and plural forms, often with ideological significance, the singular being normal in socialist uses, the plural more common in conservative descriptions. But the most significant effect of this complicated history was that there were now two common terms, increasingly

used for comparison, distinction or contrast, which had been formed within quite different models. On the one hand *middle* implied hierarchy and therefore implied **lower class**: not only theoretically but in repeated practice. On the other hand *working* implied productive or useful activity, which would leave all who were not **working class** unproductive and useless (easy enough for an aristocracy, but hardly accepted by a productive **middle class**). To this day this confusion reverberates. As early as 1844 Cockburn referred to ‘what are termed *the* working-classes, as if the only workers were those who wrought with their hands’. Yet *working man* or *workman* had a persistent reference to manual labour. In an Act of 1875 this was given legal definition: ‘the expression *workman* . . . means any person who, being a labourer, servant in husbandry, journeyman, artificer, handicraftsman, miner, or otherwise engaged in manual labour . . . has entered into or works under a contract with an employer’. The association of *workman* and **working class** was thus very strong, but it will be noted that the definition includes contract with an employer as well as manual work. An Act of 1890 stated: ‘the provisions of section eleven of the Housing of the Working Classes Act, 1885 . . . shall have effect as if the expression *working classes* included all classes of persons who earn their livelihood by wages or salaries’. This permitted a distinction from those whose livelihood depended on fees (**professional class**), profits (**trading class**) or property (**independent**). Yet, especially with the development of clerical and service occupations, there was a critical ambiguity about the class position of those who worked for a *salary* or even a *wage* and yet did not do manual labour. (*Salary* as fixed payment dates from C14; *wages and salaries* is still a normal C19 phrase; in 1868, however, ‘a manager of a bank or railway - even an overseer or a clerk in a manufactory - is said to draw a salary’, and the attempted class distinction between salaries and wages is evident; by eC20 the *salariat* was being distinguished from the *proletariat*.) Here again, at a critical point, the effect of two models of **class** is evident. The **middle class**, with which the earners of salaries normally aligned themselves, is an expression of relative social position and thus of social distinction. The **working class**, specialized from the different notion of the *useful* or *productive classes*, is an expression of economic relationships. Thus the two common modern class terms rest on different models, and the position of those who are conscious

of relative social position and thus of social distinction, and yet, within an economic relationship, sell and are dependent on their labour, is the point of critical overlap between the models and the terms. It is absurd to conclude that only the **working classes** WORK (q.v.), but if those who work in other than 'manual' labour describe themselves in terms of relative social position (**middle class**) the confusion is inevitable. One side effect of this difficulty was a further elaboration of **classing** itself (the period from 1C18 to 1C19 is rich in these derived words: classify, **classifier**, **classification**). From the 1860s the **middle class** began to be divided into *lower* and *upper* sections, and later the **working class** was to be divided into *skilled*, *semi-skilled* and *labouring*. Various other systems of classification succeeded these, notably *socio-economic group*, which must be seen as an attempt to marry the two models of **class**, and STATUS (q.v.).

It is necessary, finally, to consider the variations of **class** as an abstract idea. In one of the earliest uses of the singular social term, in Crabbe's

To every class we have a school assigned
Rules for all ranks and food for every mind

class is virtually equivalent to *rank* and was so used in the definition of a *middle class*. But the influence of sense (i), **class** as a general term for grouping, was at least equally strong, and *useful* or *productive* classes follows mainly from this. The *productive* distinction, however, as a perception of an active economic system, led to a sense of class which is neither a synonym for *rank* nor a mode of descriptive grouping, but is a description of fundamental economic relationships. In modern usage, the sense of *rank*, though residual, is still active; in one kind of use **class** is still essentially defined by birth. But the more serious uses divide between descriptive grouping and economic relationship. It is obvious that a terminology of basic economic relationships (as between employers and employed, or propertied and propertyless) will be found too crude and general for the quite different purpose of precise descriptive grouping. Hence the persistent but confused arguments between those who, using **class** in the sense of basic relationship, propose two or three basic **classes**, and those who, trying to use it for descriptive grouping, find they have to break these divisions down into smaller and smaller categories. The history of the word carries this essential ambiguity.

the language of class was being developed, in eC19, each tendency can be noted. *The Gorgon* (21 November 1818) referred quite naturally to 'a smaller class of tradesmen, termed *garret-masters*'. But Cobbett in 1825 had the newer sense: 'so that here is one class of society united to oppose another class'. Charles Hall in 1805 had argued that

the people in a civilized state may be divided into different orders; but for the purpose of investigating the manner in which they enjoy or are deprived of the requisites to support the health of their bodies or minds, they need only be divided into two classes, viz. the rich and the poor. (*The Effects of Civilization on the People in European States*)

Here there is a distinction between *orders* (*ranks*) and effective economic groupings (classes). A cotton spinner in 1818 (cit. *The Making of the English Working Class*; E. P. Thompson, p. 199) described employers and workers as 'two distinct classes of persons'. In different ways this binary grouping became conventional, though it operated alongside tripartite groupings: both the social grouping (*upper*, *middle* and *lower*) and a modernized economic grouping: John Stuart Mill's 'three classes', of 'landlords, capitalists and labourers' (*Monthly Repository*, 1834, 320) or Marx's 'three great social classes . . . wage-labourers, capitalists and landlords' (*Capital*, III). In the actual development of capitalist society, the tripartite division was more and more replaced by a new binary division: in Marxist language the *bourgeoisie* and *the proletariat*. (It is because of the complications of the tripartite division, and because of the primarily social definition of the English term **middle class**, that *bourgeoisie* and even *proletariat* are often difficult to translate.) A further difficulty then arises: a repetition, at a different level, of the variation between a descriptive grouping and an economic relationship. A class seen in terms of economic relationships can be a category (*wage-earners*) or a formation (**the working class**). The main tendency of Marx's description of classes was towards formations:

The separate individuals form a class only insofar as they have to carry on a common battle against another class; otherwise they are on hostile terms with each other as competitors. On the other

hand, the class in its turn achieves an independent existence over against the individuals, so that the latter find their conditions of existence predestined, and hence have their position in life and their personal development assigned to them by their class . . .

(*German Ideology*)

This difficult argument again attracts confusion. A **class** is sometimes an economic category, including all who are objectively in that economic situation. But a **class** is sometimes (and in Marx more often) a formation in which, for historical reasons, consciousness of this situation and the organization to deal with it have developed. Thus:

Insofar as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that separate their mode of life, their interests and their culture from those of the other classes, and put them in hostile opposition to the latter, they form a class. Insofar as there is merely a local interconnection among these small-holding peasants, and the identity of their interests begets no community, no national bond and no political organization among them, they do not form a class. (*Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*)

This is the distinction between category and formation, but since **class** is used for both there has been plenty of ground for confusion. The problem is still critical in that it underlies repeated arguments about the relation of an assumed **class consciousness** to an objectively measured **class**, and about the vagaries of self-description and self-assignment to a class scale. Many of the derived terms repeat this uncertainty. **Class consciousness** clearly can belong only to a formation. **Class struggle, class conflict, class war, class legislation, class bias** depend on the existence of formations (though this may be very uneven or partial within or between **classes**). **Class culture**, on the other hand, can swing between the two meanings: *working-class culture* can be the meanings and values and institutions of the formation, or the tastes and life-styles of the category (see also CULTURE). In a whole range of contemporary discussion and controversy, all these variable meanings of **class** can be seen in operation, usually without clear distinction. It is therefore worth repeating the basic range (outside the uncontroversial senses of general classification and education):

(i) *group* (objective); social or economic category, at varying levels (ii) *ranky* relative social position; by birth or mobility (iii) *formation*; perceived economic relationship; social, political and cultural organization

See CULTURE, INDUSTRY, MASSES, ORDINARY, POPULAR, SOCIETY, UNDERPRIVILEGED

COLLECTIVE

Collective appeared in English as an adjective from C16 and as a noun from C17. It was mainly a specialized development from **collect**, fw *collectus*, L - gathered together (there is also a fw *collector*, oF - to gather taxes or other money). **Collective** as an adjective was used from its earliest appearance to describe people acting together, or in such related phrases as **collective body** (Hooker, *Ecclesiastical Polity*, VIII, iv; 1600). Early uses of the noun were in grammar or in physical description. The social and political sense of a specific unit - 'your brethren of the Collective' (Cobbett, *Rural Rides*, II, 337; 1830) - belongs to the new DEMOCRATIC (q.v.) consciousness of eC19. This use has been revived in several subsequent periods, including mC20, but is still not common. **Collectivism**, used mainly to describe socialist economic theory, and only derivatively in the political sense of **collective**, became common in 1C19; it was described in the 1880s as a recent word, though its use is recorded from the 1850s. In France the term was used in 1869 as a way of opposing 'state socialism'.

See COMMON, DEMOCRACY, MASSES, SOCIETY

about them and vary between different societies and periods, it is soon apparent, by the character of any further definition, or by the kind of response to a request for it, whether *values* and **standards** are true plurals, grouping a number of specific positions and judgments, or plural singulars, in which a generalizing version of the essence of a civilization or a university is being projected as if it were a specific grouping of certain defined *valuations* and **standardizations**. It is very significant that the popular use of standards - laudatory - is at odds with a popular use of **standardization** - derogatory. **Standardization** came into use in 1C19, from science (standardizing the conditions of an experiment) and then industry (standardizing parts). It is not controversial in these uses, but in its application to matters of mind and experience it has been widely resisted - 'people can't be **standardized**', 'teaching mustn't be **standardized**' - by, among others, those who insist on the 'maintenance of **standards**'. This odd usage probably depends on exploiting the range of senses from **Royal Standard** (respectful) to **standard foot** (all right in its place but here inappropriate). The power of the plural singular always depends on its not being spotted as a singular. If it is not spotted, it can be used to override necessary arguments or to appropriate the very process of valuation and definition to its own particular conclusions.

A further note is necessary on the phrase **standard of living**. This is now common but sometimes difficult. Its earliest form, from mC19, was **standard of life**, and this is still often used interchangeably. Yet as we realize when we think about **standard**, the term seems to imply a defined level or a necessary level, rather than, as in its now common use, a general condition or an averaged condition. It was first used in the strict sense of **standard: standard of life** meant the necessary level of income and conditions to maintain life satisfactorily. (This was of course argued about, and could vary in different groups,, times and places, but it had a precise sense when it was first used in the campaign for a minimum wage: a **standard** would be set, and a wage could be judged by reference back to it.) This was **standard of life** in a defining and retrospective (referential) sense. But the phrase developed (subsequent to its definition, for example, in OED) towards its now more common meaning: the income and conditions we actually have. As it lost the measurable reference of **standard** it retained, nevertheless, a sense of measure-

ment. There has been controversy whether a standard *of life* or *living* can really be measured, while at the same time statistics of income, consumption, and so on have been used to define it. Standard Past, we might say, has been replaced by Standard Present. But there is also a use which draws on another sense of **standard**: not the agreed measure but, metaphorically, the flag: the **standard** we set ourselves; proper **standards** of health care; a proper **standard** of living. This is Standard Future: the old measures, or the existing grades, are inadequate, and we will aim at something better. It is a very interesting use. Instead of referring back to a source of authority, or taking a current measurable state, a **standard** is set, projected, from ideas about conditions which we have not yet realized but which we think should be realized. There is an active social history in this development of the phrase.

See DIALECT, TASTE, WESTERN

STATUS

Status has become a significant word in C20. It was taken directly into English from *status*, L - condition, which had earlier led to *state* and *estate*. It is still often used in specific Latin formations such as *status quo*. It had legal uses from C18, to define 'rights, duties, capacities or incapacities' (1832) and has survived in this sense (cf. **marital status**). Its extension to a more general social sense came from this kind of use: '*status* as free or slave' (1865); 'legal status of negroes' (1888); 'civil status of actors' (1904). There was evident extension in Mill's 'status of a day-labourer' (1848) and perhaps in 'professional status' (1883), where general rather than legal condition was implied. Thus far the word is not difficult.

It became difficult from its use in a new general sense in some modern sociology, where it is frequently offered, as a more precise and measurable term, in preference to CLASS (q.v.). It is impossible to clarify this without reference to the three main social senses of *class*, as group, rank and formation. Clearly **status** has no clear use in the senses either of group or of formation, and its real significance is that

it is a new and modernizing term for rank (losing the inherited and formal associations of that term). It can thus be substituted for *class* in only this one of its senses. But the substitution is significant, in that this sense is chosen. The use is often traced to Max Weber, and to his critique of Marx's notion of *class*. But this is a confusion. Weber's word *Stand*, often now translated as **status**, could more properly be translated as *Estate* or *Order*, with reference to and effect from traditional legal definitions of *rank*. This sense can be extended to a social group which has motivations other than the strictly economic factors of *class* in Marx's main sense: motivations such as social beliefs and ideals proper to the group, or to a distinct social condition. In more recent sociology this important social observation has been transferred to the abstract sense of a generalized rank order: 'social status . . . the position occupied by a person, family, or kinship group in a social system relative to others . . . Social status has a hierarchical distribution in which a few persons occupy the highest positions . . .' (*A Dictionary of Sociology*; G. D. Mitchell, 1968). An extraordinary technical sophistication has been brought to the elaboration of this competitive and hierarchical model of society. **Status** is a 'continuous variable' but with observable 'clusters'; these are its advantages, as a term of measurement, over *class* as rank, with its overtones of definite group or formation. They are also its disadvantages, since the term inherits (from its traditional associations) elements of respect and self-respect, which are bound to confuse the apparently objective process of **status-determination**. Where *rank* had titles and ribbons, **status** has *symbols*. But it is characteristic that these can be not only displayed but acquired: the objective or pseudo-objective signs are then confused with the subjective or merely pretentious emphases. It is especially significant that the language of **status**, in this specialized but now common sense, turns out to be the language of *class* in a deliberately reduced sense (*rank*). This has the double advantage, of appearing to cancel *class* in the sense of formation or even of broad group, and of providing a model of society which is not only hierarchical and individually competitive but is essentially defined in terms of consumption and display (see CONSUMER). Thus one 'continuous scale of social status' has been based on 'the style of life reflected in the main living room of the home', which is certainly a matter of interest but which has reduced *society* to this series of units interpreted in terms of private posses-

sions. As the units are grouped into **status-groups** or even a **status system**, the 'life' style which is being measured is life as defined by market-research, whether as goods and services or as 'public opinion'. What was once a term of legal condition or general condition (and which in its earlier adoption, in *estate*, had indicated effective social formations) is then, in its conventional modern use, an operational term for the reduction of all social questions to the terms of a mobile consumer society.

See CLASS, CONSUMER, SOCIETY

STRUCTURAL

Structure, with its associated words, is a key term in modern thought, and in many of its recent developments it is especially complex. The word is from *structur*, F, *structura*, L, rw *struere*, L - build. In its earliest English uses, from C15, **structure** was primarily a noun of process: the action of building. The word was notably developed in C17, in two main directions: (i) towards the whole product of building, as still in 'a wooden structure'; (ii) towards the manner of construction, not only in buildings but in extended and figurative applications. Most modern developments follow from (ii), but there is a persistent ambiguity in the relations between these and what are really extended and figurative applications of (i).

The particular sense that became important as an aspect of (ii) is that of 'the mutual relation of constituent parts or elements of a whole as defining its particular nature'. This is clearly an extension of the sense of a method of building, but it is characteristic that it carries a strong sense of *internal* structure, even while **structure** is still important to describe the whole construction. The earliest specialized uses were in anatomy - 'structure of the Hand' (eC17) -and the word remained important in the general development of biology, often with a distinction *from function* (*fv*, *functionem*, L, rw *fungi* - perform), where observation of the (proper) *functioning* of an organ could be distinguished from observation of the **structure**